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Grodin Joseph
Some Reflections About Justice Sullivan
by
JOSEPH R. GRODIN*
When I think of Ray Sullivan, several images come to mind, more
or less simultaneously.
I see a person learned in the law, steeped in its history and tradi-
tion, with a respect for its processes bordering on devotion. Both on
the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court, Ray left a legacy of
concern for the workings of the law--how things came to be done the
way they are done, and why. If other justices tended to be impatient
with historical or procedural matters, regarding them as complex if
not arcane, Ray provided the counterbalance. Distinctions between
law and equity, prohibition and mandamus, stays and affirmative or-
ders might cause others to yawn, but for Ray they were the stuff that
law was made of, the fabric that helped hold things together and keep
them from unraveling. When I was appointed to District One, Divi-
sion One of the Court of Appeal, the legend of Justice Sullivan
lingered; and when I came to the Supreme Court several years after
Ray had retired, research attorneys would talk about procedural ques-
tions in terms of how Justice Sullivan would have answered them.
And by then, of course, Ray was imparting his interest and excitement
about such matters to law students in his popular course on Appellate
Process.
At the same time, and not at all inconsistently, I see a judge
deeply concerned about the substance of the law, about the law's im-
pact upon people's lives, about the law's relationship to justice in a
changing world, and about the responsibility of courts to continuously
shape and mold those legal principles that are within the proper scope
of judicial authority. I see a judge with the courage to make the
choices that a judge is expected to make. Was the rule barring tort
recovery for the plaintiff's contributory negligence a defective rule by
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modern lights? Then, as the rule was court-created, courts had re-
sponsibility for changing it.1 Was the rule's codification in the Field
Code of 1872 a bar to judicial modification? Only if the Field Code is
read as freezing normal common-law development, and that premise,
counter to the entire common-law tradition, was not one that Justice
Sullivan was willing to accept.2 Did the practice of deriving local
school funds primarily from property taxes result in gross inequality of
funding, with property-poor districts bearing the brunt? Then, given
the fundamentality of education, the practice violated the equal pro-
tection principle. 3 Was the contrary view of the United States
Supreme Court an obstacle to that conclusion? Under the federal
Constitution, of course, but under the independent principles of the
California Constitution, the answer was no.4 Ray recognized, as not
all judges do, that the law is infused with moral principles, and that
moral choice is therefore unavoidable.
Finally, when I think of Ray Sullivan there comes to mind an im-
age of a face that shines-a radiance that bespeaks of kindliness, of
compassion, of inner peace, and of philosophy grand enough to en-
compass effortlessly both substance and procedure, tradition and
change. He is a person in whose presence one feels both calm and
inspired. He is a man for all seasons.
1. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(substituting a system of comparative negligence for contributory negligence).
2. Id. at 821-22, 532 P.2d at 1238-39, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
3. Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) (holding
that California's school financing system, which was primarily based upon local property
tax revenue, violated the equal protection clause of the California Constitution).
4. Id. at 764-68, 557 P.2d at 950-52, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 366-68.
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